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When dealing with multiple tasks, we often find ourselves in the problem of 7 establishing the order in which to tackle them. Here we show that confidence, the 8 subjective feeling in the accuracy of our decisions or actions, plays an active role in 9 task ordering. Our participants categorized perceptual stimuli along two dimensions 10 and reported the confidence on each decision, while we manipulated the difficulty 11 over each dimension independently. We found an effect of confidence in priority: 12 participants tended to address first the dimension they were more confident in. In 13 subsequent studies, we replicated this finding using task difficulty and response 14 accuracy as proxies for confidence: participants first responded to the easiest of the 15 two tasks, and their first choice was also more likely to be correct. We showed that 16 this effect was not due to a difference in response availability between dimensions. 17 We also extended our finding to situations of prospective confidence, and to 18 situations involving non-perceptual (mental calculation) decisions. Our results 19 support the role of confidence as a priority signal, thus strengthening the evidence 20
for confidence having an active role shaping our future behavior. 21 22 It is frequent to start a day at work by compiling in a to-do list all the tasks to complete that 23 day. But once the list is written, where do we start? Which task shall we tackle first, and 24 which tasks can be postponed? Of course, this planification problem is sometimes solved by 25 taking into account external constraints, such as scheduled meetings, imminent deadlines, 26
or the limited availability of specific tools or collaborators. In other circumstances, however, 27
we are free to decide in which order to complete our tasks. In such unconstrained situations, 28
humans may not perform their tasks in a random order, and they might instead exhibit some 29 systematic preference for doing one task before another. Here, we suggest and test the 30 hypothesis that confidence may play a role in this prioritization problem, in the sense that 31 people tend to first complete the task in which they experience the highest confidence. 32 33
Different considerations make this hypothesis plausible. Firstly, even in the absence of 34 external rewards, the feeling that we have completed a task successfully, and that we can 35 cross an item off our to-do list, may be intrinsically rewarding. Confidence corresponds to 36 this feeling of success in the taska feeling that is generally valid in perceptual 1,2 and 37 memory tasks 3 , amongst others, where confidence typically correlates positively with 38 performance. Therefore, in order to obtain rewards as soon as possible, people could seek 39 to complete their easy tasks first 4 . Another reason to expect that humans would prioritize 40 easy tasks over harder tasks is to reduce their mental workload 5 . Indeed, having multiple 41 pending tasks can divide our attention and diminish our cognitive resources, what would 42 impact performance especially on complex tasks. In order to face the most demanding tasks 43 with a reduced mental workload, agents could complete first the easier tasks. To do so, they 44 could compare their confidence across the different tasks at hand 6,7 , and prioritize them 1 accordingly. 2 3
To evaluate whether confidence guides task prioritization, we used a simple experimental 4 paradigm involving elementary perceptual decisions. On each trial (see Figure 1A ), 5 participants (n=10) were presented an array of colored letters and they had to report both 6 the dominant color (orange or blue) and the dominant letter (X or O) in the stimulus. 7
Immediately after they had to give a confidence rating for each choice, on a subjective 8 probability scale of success ranging from 50% (i.e. pure guess) to 100% (i.e. completely 9 certain of being correct). By calibrating the stimulus before the main experiment (see 10 methods), for each task we obtained an easy and a hard condition, which corresponded to 11 an expected 90% and 60% of correct responses, respectively. As Figure 1B shows, 12
observed performance in the experiment closely matched expected performance. 
16
Each element could be an O or an X, colored blue or orange. After the stimuli disappeared, a response screen 17 appeared. Four boxes were presented, each containing one of the four elements related to the choice.
18
Participants gave their response to the color task by clicking on the box containing either the blue or the orange 19 square, and to the letter task by clicking on the box containing either the O or the X. Next two scales, one for the 20 color task and another for the letter task, appeared on the screen disposed as a cross. Participants could then 21 rate their confidence on each task's decision, from 50 (total uncertainty) to 100 (total certainty 
27
Participants below the dashed, identity line expressed more confidence in their first choices, and vice versa. D.
28
Density of the proportion of trials where the first choice had a higher confidence rating than the second choice.
29
The red density corresponds to the whole dataset, while the pink density corresponds only to those EE and HH Critically, although participants were not asked to report their judgments in a specific order, 4 we expected that they would report first the judgment associated with a higher confidence. 5
This was indeed the case on average across trials: confidence in the first choice was higher 6 than confidence in the second choice ( Figure 1C , t(9) = 4.569, p = 0.001). It was also the 7 case within each trial, as the proportion of trials in which the confidence associated to the 8 first choice was greater than that associated to the second was systematically greater than 9 0.5 (black line in Figure 1D , t(9) = 4.479, p = 0.002). Furthermore, this pattern held even 10 when we included only trials in which both responses were correct and both dimensions had 11 the same difficulty level (grey line in Figure 1D , t(9) = 2.442, p = 0.037). Note that, by 12 construction, this later analysis confirms that participants' priority was driven by confidence 13 per se, and not simply by task difficulty or response accuracy. 14 15
In the experiment above, participants may have associated their confidence ratings with task 16
priority simply because they had to explicitly report their confidence. Our previous result (i.e. 17
'easy-first' bias in task prioritization) would be strengthened if it could be replicated by using 18 an experimental paradigm that eliminated the possibility of it being caused by an implicit 19 demand effect. In our second experiment, thus, we tested our hypothesis without asking for 20 confidence ratings, by relying instead on response accuracy and task difficulty as proxies for 21 confidence. Indeed, in our first experiment we observed that reported confidence was 22
greater for correct responses than for errors, and greater for easy tasks than for hard tasks 23 (for details see supplementary information 2.2.), as typically found in the confidence 24 literature 1,3,8 . 25 26 We therefore asked a new set of participants (n=20) to perform the same dual task without 27 confidence ratings. Figure 2A depicts the proportion of times the first response was related 28
to the color task, in each of the four possible kind of trials: easy color -easy letter (EE), easy 29 color -hard letter (EH), hard color -easy letter (HE), and hard color -hard letter (HH). If 30 confidence truly guided the priority of the responses, participants should exhibit a bias 31 towards responding to the easy task before the difficult task. We found that, indeed, the color 32 judgment was reported first on 42% of EH trials and on 37% of HE trials. This difference in 33
proportion was highly consistent across participants (t(19) = 3.059, p = 0.006), as illustrated 34
by Figure 2B . In other words, participants' task prioritization was affected by task difficulty, 35
as a proxy for confidence, such that participants exhibited an easy-first bias. 36 37
Another validation of the link between priority and confidence could come from data on 38 response accuracy. Indeed, since accuracy correlates with confidence in our experimental 39 conditions (as found in our first study), the confidence-priority link could translate into an 40 accuracy-priority link. Confirming this, we found that first choices were more accurate than 41 second choices (t(19) = 2.969, p = 0.008, Figure 2C ). We also verified that this result held 42 when only including trials with equal difficulty levels (i.e. EE and HH) in the analysis (t(19) = 43 2.097, p = 0.049). Using this subset of our data was important to guarantee that this 44 measure was independent from our previous analysis (involving only the EH and HE trial 45 types). For completeness, we also confirmed that the same results were obtained in our 46 previous study when using expected difficulty and response accuracy as proxies for 47 confidence (see supplementary information 2.3.). 48 
22
In our third experiment, we wanted to discard one possible interpretation of our results in 23 terms of response availability. In our previous experiments, the response screen was 24 presented immediately after the stimuli disappeared, so one could argue that only the 25 decision for the easy task had been reached by then. If that was true, then the easy-first 26 priority effect could be due to response availability rather than confidence. To tackle this 27 concern, we modified our previous experiment by introducing a delay (0s, 2s, or 4s, 28 randomized across trials) between the stimulus offset and the onset of the response screen. 29 We reasoned that, if the easy-first effect was only driven by response availability at the 30 response screen onset, then it should disappear for long delays. We ran this experiment with 31 new participants (n=30) and then calculated again the proportion of trials in which color was 32 first responded to in EH trials and in HE trials, now for each delay condition. We found that 33 the main effect of trial type was significant overall (F(1,29) = 6.098, p = 0.020), with an easy-1 first bias replicating our previous studies. And although the main effect of delay was also 2 significant (F(2,29) = 12.760, p < 0.020), it did not interact with trial type (p = 0.679, see also 3 Figure 2D ). This data thus ruled out the concern that participants responded to the easy task 4
first because it was the only task for which a decision was available by the time the response 5 screen was presented. 6 7 We note nonetheless that it is still possible that participants answered the easy task first 8 because it was the first for which a decision was made, even if both decisions had been 9 reached by the time the response screen appeared. This possibility is difficult to eliminate 10 when investigating priority and confidence about past stimuli, decisions and responses. 11
However, it can be circumvented by relying on prospective estimates of difficulty and 12
confidence, instead of retrospective ones. Prospective confidence corresponds to the 13 anticipated probability of success one has before engaging in a task, based for instance on 14
prior experience with the same task 9,10 . We implemented this idea in our next experiment. 15
First we familiarized participants with two tasks, one easy and one hard. Then, we let them 16 choose the order in which they would face the same two tasks in a subsequent test phase. 17
In other words, unlike in our previous experiments where we measured priority from the 18 ordering of the two responses, in this new design we could measure priority as the choice of 19 engaging in one task before the other, very much like in the to-do list example. 20 21
With our fourth experiment, we thus evaluated whether task prioritization could be driven by 22 prospective confidence as well. This experiment was conducted on a new sample of 23 participants (n=31), which completed 32 experimental blocks, each constituted of a 24 familiarization and a test phase ( Figure 3A ). In the familiarization phase, participants 25 completed two sets of trials. Each set contained 6 trials, and was associated with a name 26 and a task (either color or letter). Importantly, one set contained only hard trials, while the 27 other set contained only easy trials. Difficulty was calibrated before the experiment ( Figure  28 3B), and the order of the easy and hard set was random. After the familiarization with both 29 sets was completed, the test phase started. Participants were presented with the names of 30 both sets, and they could choose the order in which they wanted to complete 4 trials of each 31 set. They knew that performance in these test trials would determine their final payoff. 32
Critically, participants chose more often to face the easy set first ( Figure 3C , t(30) = 2.284, p 33 = 0.030). These results thus replicate the easy-first bias found in our previous experiments, 34
and demonstrate that prospective confidence too can establish the priority of one task over 35
another. Interestingly, whether the two sets involved different tasks or the same task did not 36 affect this priority effect (p = 0.256). This suggests that the comparison of the two sets 37
involved relatively abstract representations, as was found for confidence comparison 6,11 . 38 39 15 16 Finally, we aimed at evaluating the generalizability of our findings beyond perceptual 17 decisions. For this, we conducted another experiment to test whether the easy-first priority 18 bias found in our previous studies would also manifest itself when considering simple 19 problems of mental calculation. On each trial, two schematics of mental calculation problems 20
were presented ( Figure 4A ). One was a priori more difficult than the other, in the sense that 21 it included a multiplication or a division (e.g. "x+y/z"), instead of only additions or 22
subtractions (e.g. "x+y-z"). The problems were otherwise matched in the number of elements 23 and operations they involved. Participants had to click on one of the schematics to reveal the 24 actual problem, which they then had to solve. Immediately after, participants had to solve the 25 non-chosen problem. Although there was no difference in performance between easy and 26 hard problems (p = 0.874), the response times for the hard problems were significantly 27 longer ( Figure 4B , t(83) = 9.079, p < 0.001), proving that they were more demanding. Most 28 participants predominantly chose to solve the easy problem first ( Figure 4C 
12
To summarise, we found that, when facing task prioritization problems, participants exhibited 13 a systematic bias towards addressing first the task in which they had greater confidence. We 14 replicated the original finding in four more experiments. Converging evidence came from 15 different measures, using task difficulty, expected accuracy and observed accuracy as 16 proxies for confidence, but also using actual confidence ratings. In terms of generalizability, 17
we demonstrated that this effect was present in both situations involving retrospective and 18
prospective confidence, and both situations involving perceptual and non-perceptual tasks, 19
such as mental calculation. 20 21
Situations in which we face multiple tasks present a huge diversity, and task prioritization is 22 likely determined by a varied set of factors, most of which were not manipulated in our 23 design. For instance, prioritization can be driven by personal interest and the familiarity with 24 the task 12 . We did also not manipulate the duration of each task, although there is evidence 25 from real-life situations where people tended to approach first the shortest tasks 13 . Although 26 in our experiments the two tasks were presented simultaneously, previous research has 27
shown that task prioritization also depends on the time at which task-relevant information is 28 presented 14 . We therefore only claim that confidence is one among many forces driving task 29 prioritization. In our data, we find a large inter-individual variability in the general tendency to 30 prioritize the color or the letter task (Figure 2A , see also supplementary information 3.1.), 31
and we found that the locations of the different choice options on the screen could also bias 32 task priority (see supplementary information 3.2.). Whether this variability is due to strategies 33 or heuristics explicitly chosen by participants, or to differences in their perceptual or decision 34 processes, remains to be investigated. Another factor that deserves more scrutiny is the 35 reward associated with each task, which should affect task priority. In our experiments, we 36 purposefully avoided any difference in reward between both tasks within a trial. We also did 37 not instruct or incentivize participants to prioritize the more confident or the more accurate of 38 the two decisions. In sum, nothing in the instructions or the reward structure pushed 39 participants to prioritize one task over the other. Some of the aforementioned features could 40 Another important issue for future research is whether this strategy of approaching the easy 4 task first is adaptive. A priori, reducing the mental workload before tackling more difficult 5 tasks could be beneficial. In our data, however, we found no clear evidence that addressing 6 the easy task first led to better performance. Overall, participants were neither better nor 7
worse when responding first to the easy task than when responding first to the hard task 8 (see supplementary information 4.1.). To further investigate this issue, we conducted an 9
additional experiment comparing a free response order condition (which replicated 10
Experiment 2) to an imposed order condition in which the choice for the hard task was 11 required either first or second (see supplementary information 4.2.). We found that 12
participants' performances were similar between these two conditions, suggesting that, in 13 our paradigm, the confidence-driven prioritization does not lead to an advantage in task 14
performance. In other words, while we cannot claim that there is no advantage behind 15 confidence-driven prioritization, our manipulation could not find it. 16 17
Our study highlights a new way in which confidence actively shapes our behavior. It 18 therefore contributes to a growing literature showing how confidence is not a mere 19
commentary on performance but actually affects individual or collective decisions. Previous 20 research showed how, when agents interact, the confidence with which an advice is 21 expressed affects the use of this information by others 15-17 and how well the group will 22 perform 18 . At the individual level, confidence may serve as a teaching signal when feedback 23
is unavailable [19] [20] [21] [22] . It also influences the amount of resources we engage in a task 23, 24 . Here 24
we show that confidence does not only determine how we do a task, but also when we plan 25
to do it. 26 27
Understanding how people decide to perform one task before another may have practical 28 consequences for the management of individuals and organizations. This motivated some 29 studies that focused on different applied scenarios. Some of this previous work already 30
found that individuals address easier tasks first when they can decide their task schedule. 31
For instance, students appear to prioritize easier course assignments over difficult ones 25 , 32 and the expected easiness of finding the relevant information affects their prioritization of a 33 web-search task over another 12 . Physicians at an emergency department do prioritize easy 34 patient cases, especially under high workload contexts 4 . The present study makes several 35 unique contributions to this research topic: we extend this result to situations involving 36 immediate decisions, we link the easy-first bias to confidence, and we offer a strict control 37 over performance in the task via our psychophysical procedures. Finally, although we did not 38 find a clear consequence from the easy-first bias on performance, previous research has 39
shown that in another context this strategy was associated with both short-term benefits and 40 long-term costs. Indeed, prioritizing easy cases allowed physicians to treat more patients per 41 unit of time, but across individuals it was associated with a lower productivity and less 42 revenue for the hospital 4 12 For experiments 1-4, the task consisted in reporting the dominant letter and the dominant 13 color of an array of 80 letters (Xs or Os), colored blue or orange (see Figure 1A ). Each trial 14
started with a 500 ms fixation cross, followed by a 300 ms blank period, and then by the 15 stimulus, which was presented for 1 s. Each letter, in Arial font, occupied approximately 0.5º 16 (degrees of visual angle). Elements were presented within a 10º wide imaginary square. 17
These stimuli  were  based  on  the  code  available  at  18 https://github.com/DobyRahnev/Confidence-leak and used in a previous publication 27 . 19 20 After the stimuli disappeared, the response screen was presented, which consisted in 4 21 square boxes that contained a blue square, an orange square, a white O and a white X (see 22 Figure 1A ). The 4 boxes were randomly arranged in a 2x2 grid on each trial. Participants 23 gave their response by clicking on a color box and a letter box, in their preferred order. A first 24 response on one dimension (e.g. clicking on the X box) made the corresponding boxes 25 disappear, leaving only the boxes for the other dimension (e.g. the orange box and the blue 26 box), which required a second response. 27 28
Participants completed 4 parts of 4 blocks each, with 25 trials per block. Between block and 29 block, participants could rest for 15 seconds, and at the end of each part they could take 30 self-timed breaks. 31
Manipulation of task difficulty (experiments 1-4) 32
For each perceptual task, difficulty was manipulated by changing the proportion of the 33 dominant over the non-dominant feature. After a short training, we used psychophysical 34 staircases to estimate, separately for each task, the proportion of items that should be used 35 for responses to be 90% correct (easy condition) or 60% correct (hard condition). Details of 36 the training and staircase procedure are presented in supplementary information 1.1. We 37 then used these parameters in the main experimental part to manipulate difficulty on the 38 letter (easy vs. hard) and color (easy vs. hard) tasks, orthogonally within each participant, in 39 a 2x2 factorial design. We collected 100 trials for each of the 4 conditions, with trials of all 40 conditions intermixed within blocks. 41 1 In Experiment 1, after participants made their two choices, they had to rate their confidence 2 on each of them. Two confidence scales were simultaneously presented, one horizontal for 3 the letter task and one vertical for the color task (see Figure 1A ), or vice-versa (randomized 4 across trials). Each scale featured the two response categories at its ends (which 5 corresponded to 100% confidence) and an empty region at its center (near which confidence 6 was at 50%). The two choices participants had made on that trial were surrounded by a 7 yellow circle. Participants gave their confidence levels on both tasks by clicking on the 8 corresponding scales, and then validated the ratings by clicking at the center of the screen. 9
Participants were told that maximum uncertainty (no preference between their response and 10 the other option within the same task) corresponded to a 50% confidence, and absolute 11 certainty on the choice to a 100% confidence. 12 Experiment 4: anticipated difficulty in prospective confidence 23 In Experiment 4, participants only responded to one task on each trial. Therefore, the 24 response screen uniquely contained the two relevant boxes. The main part was organized in 25 32 blocks. All blocks included a familiarization and a test phase ( Figure 3A ). During the 26 familiarization phase, participants completed two sets of 6 trials. Each set was associated to 27 a single task (color or letter), a difficulty level (easy or hard), and an animal name (randomly 28 chosen without replacement from a predefined list of common names). Based on staircases 29 ran before the main phase, the proportion for the task-relevant dimension was 30 experimentally controlled, such that for each block, one set contained difficult trials and the 31 other easy trials (for the non-relevant dimension, the proportion was always set at 50%). 32
This manipulation was not revealed to participants but they could learn the difficulty of each 33 set by performing the task during the familiarization phase. After the familiarization, the test 34 phase started. Participants saw a screen with two horizontally aligned boxes presenting (in a 35 random position) the animal names of the two sets just completed. 4 trials of each set had to 36 be completed, with reward in that block depending on performance in that part. Participants 37 decided the order in which to complete the test trials of each set by clicking on the name of 38 the set they desired to complete first. We used animal names to avoid any obvious order 39 bias (set A vs B, or 1 vs 2) for this decision (for the complete list of set names, see 40 supplementary information 5.1.). Across blocks, we manipulated factorially the task 41 (color/letter) used for the first set in the block, the task (color/letter) used for the second set, 42 and the order of the difficulty levels used for the two sets (easy first vs. hard first). This 1 design resulted in 8 conditions, presented in a randomized order as a sequence 4 times per 2 participant. 3 Experiment 5: anticipated difficulty in a mental calculation task 4 The stimuli used in Experiment 5 were different from those used in the rest of experiments. 5
On each trial, two horizontally aligned boxes appeared (see Figure 4A ), each containing a 6 simple formula (e.g. "a+2b") . Our formulas involved letters connected by basic operators (+,  7 -, *, /) and were sometimes nested by brackets. Both problems were similar except for the 8 operators connecting their respective letters. One of the problems (easy) contained additions 9
and subtractions, while the other (hard) contained multiplications and divisions. The easy 10 and hard box were randomly positioned on the left or the right of the screen on every trial. 11
Participants had to solve both problems in their prefered order. By clicking on one box, the 12 letters of the formula in that box were replaced by one-digit integers. Participants then typed 13 their response, which appeared inside a box below the problem. They could change it as 14 they wanted before pressing the ENTER key to validate it. Then, the non-clicked on problem 15 appeared for participants to give their response through the same method. Each participant 16
completed the same 20 pairs of questions (listed in supplementary information 5.2.), but in a 17 random order. The initial presentations of formulae ensured participants could not try to 18 solve the problems before making a choice. 19 Payoff 20 Performance on the main part of the experiments determined the final amount of money 21 participants won. In experiments 2 and 3, for each of the 16 blocks, a random trial was 22 chosen. Within that trial, the choice for either color or letter was also randomly picked. If that 23 choice had been correct, the participant received 1 €, and 0 € otherwise. This payoff method 24 ensured participants kept a stable performance and did not relax their attention or 25 automatized their responses during some trials. 26 27
In Experiment 1, the payoff system was slightly different. Once a trial and a choice had been 28 selected within a block, a number was selected from a uniform distribution between 0 and 29 100. If the number was lower than the confidence given for that choice, the payoff depended 30 on performance. If the number was higher, another random number was sampled from a 31 uniform distribution between 0 and 100. If this number was lower than the confidence value, 32 1€ was given, and 0€ otherwise. This system has previously 28 been adopted to ensure that 33 participants try to accurately rate their confidence, since their payoff depends on it. On top of 34 this, participants were awarded a fixed 3€ just for the added length reporting confidence 35 gave to the experiment. 36 37
In Experiment 4, payoff was similar to Experiment 2, but given the more numerous and 38
shorter blocks, each of them could be rewarded with only 0.5€. The rest between blocks was 39 also shorter, with a duration of 10 s. 40 41
Experiment 5 had a payoff system which mimicked that of the previous experiments. At the 42 end of the experiment, two trials were chosen randomly. For each of these selected trials, 43 the answer to one of the problems was picked. If the answer was correct, participants 1 received 1€, and nothing otherwise. 2 3
Before starting each experiment, participants were carefully informed about the procedure. 4 The payoff structure and its objective were made clear, and the fact that reward did not 5
depend on their response times was also pointed out. 6 Statistics 7 All t-tests reported in the results are two-tailed. 8 9
